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In the last 25  years, the world has seen more casino developments among aspiring 
countries than any point in history. From Africa, to Europe, to the North, South, and 
Central America, to Asia, and even Oceania, aspiring nation-states have sought to tap 
into the potential of casino gambling for industry diversification, urban redevelopment, 
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which modelled Las Vegas, such as Atlantic City, did not have as much luck. In this 
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the giants”. Yet, perhaps explaining why no country can really replicate the successful 
development experiences of Las Vegas and Macao, most countries fail to see beyond 
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make Las Vegas and Macao; e.g., with respect to the presence of domestic organized 
crime groups. This paper delves deep into identifying the key actors and circumstances 
that made the aforementioned cities what they are today, elucidating the integral 
development strategies used during their formative years. Utilizing a Marxian approach 
to understanding the state and state-civil society relations, the paper elucidates why 
no country can really replicate the development models of Las Vegas and Macao 
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recommendations are provided for future research and pragmatic endeavours.
Keywords: Casino development, Macao, Las Vegas, State-crime ties, Non-state actors, 
State actors, Instrumentalist theory, South–south cooperation, Intelligence liaison
Open Access
© 2015 Khiatani. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate 
if changes were made.
RESEARCH
Khiatani  Bandung J of Global South  (2015) 1:8 
DOI 10.1186/s40728-015-0024-8
*Correspondence:   
founderstar@hotmail.com 
Department of Applied 
Social Sciences, City 
University of Hong Kong, 83 
Tat Chee Ave, Kowloon, Hong 
Kong
Page 2 of 18Khiatani  Bandung J of Global South  (2015) 1:8 
and mass job provisions for citizens (Global Market Advisors 2015). As a tool for eco-
nomic development, casino gambling, or casino gaming as it is commonly referred to 
now, has always been somewhat of an elusive option for economic development; one 
which beckons addressing concerns of morals, well-being, national image, and religion. 
Yet, as the last 25 years have shown, casino developments have been rampant, both with 
its successes and failures among aspirers from the Global North and Global South. One 
common factor among all though, i.e., those who have developed casino-resorts and/or 
those who aspire to develop casino-resorts, is their reference to the ‘proof of concept’ for 
justifying the benefits accrued from casino-resort developments; that is, when lioniz-
ing the benefits of casino gaming and integrated resorts for economic development and 
entertaining the prospects of attaining such promises through developing casino-cities, 
the countries participating in the “new global race to become ‘world-class’ tourist and 
business centers” (Fu and Murray 2014, p. 843) often reference, if not even model after, 
Las Vegas and Macao.
Las Vegas and Macao: proof of concept for becoming a ‘world‑class city’
In the mid-to-late 20th century, the world witnessed unprecedented growth from two 
lands distant from one another; one in the East, located near Mainland China, and the 
other in the West, a Midwest state in the United States. Before this, both lands were 
struggling financially as one suffered from vicious cycles of economic crises (Pina-Cabral 
2002) and the other was a barren land, waiting for intervention from the federal gov-
ernment or some ‘miracle’ worker (Gottdiener et  al. 1999). Moreover, both lands had 
a prominent presence of organized crime groups and street gangs (Gottdiener et  al. 
1999; Gunn 1995), who brought along with themselves relentless capacity for violence 
and other crimes. The political authorities, suffering from a limited statehood, of the two 
lands had no clear agenda for socio-economic development and the two lands remained 
institutionally underdeveloped, unattractive for foreign investment, and lagging behind 
the world’s advancement.
Despite how bleak the situation seemed for these two economic ‘boom-crisis’ cycle, 
gang-infested lands, however, they underwent a historic transformation; from backwater 
and barren, unattractive lands to world-renowned and celebrated casino-driven capital-
ist societies in 40 years-time.
Looking at the historical development of Las Vegas and Macao, it is clear that casino 
development projects promise great benefits for sustained socioeconomic and commu-
nity development. Casino gaming ventures provide tax revenues for the government, 
jobs for the civil society, and acts as a secondary economic driver by stimulating com-
mercial activity and infrastructure development around casino gaming (Global Market 
Advisors 2015; Rephann et  al. 1997). This all, in turn, helps with community devel-
opment and puts the casino-city on the forefront of tourism bulletins, hailed for its 
vibrancy and entertainment value.
Yet, especially among those that look to Las Vegas and Macao as the ideal model for 
casino development, the mass proliferation of casino gambling around the world will 
always fall short of replicating the exact successes of Las Vegas and Macao. According 
to Thompson (1998), in talking about Las Vegas, the odds of replicating such a marvel 
is likened to the odds of hitting a ten spot in Keno; that is, 8,911,700–1 (Vlcek 2015). 
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The claim, however, lacked reference to historical contexts or factors underpinning the 
development of the two casino-cities through a historical perspective. Thus, how did Las 
Vegas and Macao get to be what it is today, who made this possible, and how?
Morris Dalitz and Stanley Ho: kings of their ‘gaming empires’
Miraculous as the transformation of Las Vegas and Macao may seem, it was not due 
to providence or chance. Rather, upon perusal of search results for the likely ‘history-
maker’, the glory for transforming the cities goes to two businessmen—Mr. Morris 
‘Barney’ Dalitz, also known as Moe Dalitz, for Las Vegas during the 1940s–1980s and 
Dr. Stanley Ho Hung Sun for Macao during the 1960s–2000s. These two businessmen, 
despite not having any advanced degrees in Developmental Economics or Casino Man-
agement, were able to be the ‘savior’ the lands needed when the states and economic 
elites failed to find enduring economic solutions as they succeeded in promoting eco-
nomic and social growth for the two lands. They were lauded with honorary titles and 
distinctions, often labeled as ‘King’ of their respective territories, both locally and inter-
nationally. However, upon a closer look, it becomes apparent that these two men were 
not ‘stand-up’ figures in society. During the nascent stages of development of the two 
gambling hubs, rumors and allegations that the two men had ties (and used those ties) to 
organized crime groups and criminal outfits surfaced. The same men who had ties to the 
government and statesmen and businessmen in their respective territory also had ties 
to organized criminal groups and outlaws. Thus, raises a puzzling question that builds 
on the initial inquiry: Who were these ‘connected’ men and how did they transform the 
cities with ties to the underworld and mainstream society? How do we make sense of 
them and how can we account for their exemplary ability to guide the development of 
casino-cities?
Upperworld and underworld in governance
Popular thought during the 20th century was that the state governed the society and set 
the agenda for the development of society, independent of elite and ruling class inter-
est (Hall and Ikenberry 1989; Skocpol 1979, 1992). Miliband (1969, p. 1) puts it best, “It 
was once believed, and perhaps believed even so today, that man live in the shadow of 
the state. Individual or group achievement is largely based on the support or sanctions 
by the state.” If such popular thought persisted during the 20th century, then why did 
the state assume a subservient role in the cases of the developing Las Vegas and Macao 
during the 20th century, allowing Mr. Moe Dalitz and Dr. Stanley Ho to take the ‘devel-
opment’ driving wheel and be hailed as ‘King’ of their respective empires? What exactly 
was its role in the formation of the casino-driven capitalist society? Against this wave of 
‘state-centric’ theorists were the society-centric theorists, whose central tenets revolved 
around proving that the state was subservient to the control of the capitalist elites (Bar-
row 1993; Miliband 1977). The capitalist elites, in the tradition set out by Miliband’s 
instrumentalist theory of the state (1969), challenged state-centric theorists by claiming 
that the state was not autonomous but rather an ‘instrument’ used by the elites to fulfill 
the interests of the capitalist class (Barrow 1993).
Yet, even in this intellectual battle with the state-centric theorists, society-centric 
theorists were ‘upperworld-centric’ and neglected actors of the ‘underworld’, i.e., not 
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focusing on the relational powers of the elites in the underworld, such as organized 
crime kingpins. Previous studies have documented collusions between economic elites 
or political elites and organized crime groups (Hagedorn 2007; Simon 2008) in a wide 
variety of contexts, e.g., in a Chinese context (Lo 2010), Dutch context (Van Duyne 
1993), and Indian context (Sreedhar 2013). As of the 20th century, organized crime 
groups have become increasingly ‘inter-twined’ into the webs of the political economy 
and become players in the ‘upperworld’. Moreover, although not always, such collusions 
between the ‘upperworld’ and the ‘underworld’ also do occur in a triadic union of three; 
an economic-political-criminal nexus of sorts. This is particularly evident, albeit under-
studied, in recent cases around the world (see Chin 2003 for Taiwan; Patrucic 2014 for 
Montenegro; and the Research Institute for European and American Studies 2014 for 
Ukraine). This neglect not only significantly hampers our understanding of the behav-
ioral characteristics and organization of the ‘upperworld–underworld symbiose’ (Ven-
katesh 2013) but also exposes our gross ignorance of the relation between this symbiose 
and our society. For example, and in line with another dimension of study the society-
centric theorists oversaw, the dynamics of interaction among the ruling class and organ-
ized crime groups in the context of limited statehood. This is particularly important 
when considering aspects of governance, where, according to literature (Amsden and 
DiCaprio 2012; Risse 2013), non-state actors can overtake the state in functions of gov-
ernance and assume responsibility in driving the development of a society with limited 
statehood, e.g., through non-hierarchical steering methods (Risse 2013). Not much is 
known nor conceptualized on the triadic union and its impact on areas of limited state-
hood, which is where this study serves to contribute to; i.e., by examining the influence 
these ‘connected’ economic elites had on their respective ‘gaming empires’ and the simi-
lar and divergent strategies they used to transform the lands. This study will concep-
tualize the investigated triadic union by using the term ‘State-Crime Elites’ to describe 
economic elites that strategically use relations with both statesmen and organized crime 
to pursue their interests. The term in no way suggests that the economic elite is a crimi-
nal himself/herself, unless specified in the analysis; rather, it places emphasis on the 
state-crime ties characteristic of the elite.
About the study
The theoretical light and perspective that the society-centric theorists sheds over exam-
ining the cases of Las Vegas and Macao proves as a suitable framework to adopt in this 
study. Following the theoretical footsteps set by Miliband (1969), Domhoff (1990, 1996), 
Mills (1956), i.e., studying relations and interactions between state and non-state actors 
as imperative to developing an understanding of how the society dominates the state, 
this study will begin with a historical perspective and then a relational perspective of 
the social actors in their juxtaposed time frame. This is ideal for two reasons: (1) The 
historical perspective can elucidate the background and development of the social actor, 
as well as shedding light on his/her ‘enduring’ connections; and (2) the relational per-
spective can elucidate ‘key’ social relationships formed during the chosen time frame 
which helped the social actor transform the land and build his/her empire. Moreover, it 
can help highlight strategies used with respect to his/her social network. Employing this 
framework to examine the cases of Las Vegas and Macao and their ‘Kings’, Mr. Morris 
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Dalitz for 1940s–1980s and Dr. Stanley Ho for 1960s–2000s respectively, presents a 
unique opportunity to elucidate how the triadic union would govern or behave in a con-
text of a developing society with limited statehood.
Taken together, results of this study have implications for academic and pragmatic 
endeavours. On the former end, this study would be significant for advancing our 
understanding of the roles of state and non-state actors in areas of limited statehood 
and developing economies. Furthermore, this study would contribute to our under-
standing of the relational dynamics and powers of non-state actors of the underworld, 
especially in colluding with economic and political elites; i.e., to form a triadic union. 
On the latter end, this study would be significant for advancing our understanding of 
casino-city developments; especially for demystifying previous thoughts on the develop-
ment of Las Vegas and Macao and providing new insights to inform future endeavours 
in casino development. As the Global South continues to entertain possibilities of devel-
oping gaming-resorts or a casino-city for socio-economic growth, such as in Sri Lanka 
and Fiji, it is imperative to take a step back and acquire insights from the developmental 
histories of the ‘proofs of concept’ to inform future development. For example, insights 
on the challenges and opportunities of modelling after Las Vegas and Macao in the 21st 
century.
As the aforementioned questions set the fertile ground for a case-based historical soci-
ological study, the following refined inquiries serve as the drivers of this research study:
RQ.1: What were the common and divergent patterns and strategies used between the 
two state-crime elites, Stanley Ho and Moe Dalitz?
RQ.2: What influence did the state-crime elites have on the development of their 
respective gaming hubs; Stanley Ho on Macao and Moe Dalitz on Las Vegas?
RQ.3: What can we learn from the development of Las Vegas and Macao and how is it 
relevant for aspiring casino-cities in the Global South?
Methods
The major research method employed is the comparative historical research method. 
Three research strategies are used: the case-based comparative strategy, documentary 
analysis, and social network analysis (ego-centered network).
Case‑based comparative strategy
In light of the resemblances between the two cases, a comparative historical research 
method is ideal for comparing the two cases and understanding how the focal actors 
used their relations with state and criminal agents to shape their respective ‘gaming 
empires’.
In comparative research, there are two strategies one can follow—Durkheim’s variable-
based strategy or Weber’s case-based strategy (Ragin and Zaret 1983). Durkheim’s var-
iable-based strategy conceives explanations from comparing and “testing propositions 
about general patterns of relationships among abstract variables” (Ragin and Zaret 1983, 
p. 740). While it does have its advantages, it does not produce historically-grounded 
explanations and generalizations that accounts for causes and consequences of historical 
diversity (Ragin and Zaret 1983). Weber’s case-based strategy retains contextual effects 
of historical origins as it encapsulates a variety of factors pertaining to investigated 
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cases. This study will use the Weber case-based strategy. As such, the selected cases are 
defined as specific, empirical units.
Documentary and archival records
Primary sources of data are drawn from the analysis of official documents, archival col-
lections, biographies, newspapers and periodicals, and reports from government bodies 
and universities. As previous criminologists have echoed (e.g., Varese 2012), studying 
criminals will always be a challenge; thus, reports from the FBI and other law enforce-
ments that collect intelligence on the criminals would be of paramount importance. Sec-
ondary sources of data include books, dissertations, journal papers, magazine articles, 
and newspapers from online databases and libraries.
The documents used in this study can be retrieved from online databases, university 
libraries, the historical archives of Macao, and government bodies.
Social network analysis (ego‑centered network)
In Social network analysis (SNA), a method used to study formal properties of social 
relations (Carrington and Scott 2011), there are two types of networks that can be made: 
complete networks and ego-centered networks (Martino and Spoto 2006). Complete 
networks involve mathematical models to analyze networks that can span cities and 
communities; whole networks from community data using quantitative methods (Car-
rington and Scott 2011). Popular among social movement studies, anthropological stud-
ies, historical studies, and even primary health studies, ego-centered networks revolves 
around understanding the relations between actors (alters) and the focal person (ego) 
through documentary sources, interviewing, surveying, and ethnographic investiga-
tions; personal networks from personal data using qualitative methods (Martino and 
Spoto 2006; Scott 2013). Thus, an ego-centered network is often smaller and more com-
prehensive than complete networks as it follows a focal individual and retains the con-
textual information surrounding his/her relations with the actors. One exemplary study 
is that by Wong (2009) on state-society relations in the Philippines. Although the net-
work diagram was not included in the written piece, Wong (2009) was able to articulate 
comprehensive narratives which retained contextual backgrounds and elucidated rela-
tional dimensions of the ego with alters across time.
There are two broad strategies to specify the boundaries of networks: (1) Realist strat-
egy. (2) Nominalist strategy (Scott 2013, p. 43). In the ‘Realist’ strategy, boundaries are 
thought to be real as they are informed by participants who perceive actual boundaries 
of social groups and organizations (Scott 2013). In the ‘Nominalist’ strategy, bounda-
ries are formed by the researcher in categories based on analytical significance, e.g., 
relational properties and characteristics alters share with the focal actor (Scott 2013). 
This study will use the latter strategy as documentary sources cannot elucidate the ‘true’ 
nature of relations but can provide data which informs the formation of boundaries 
based on analytical significance, e.g., attributes, relational properties, and shared activi-
ties with potential members they share similar characteristics with (Martino and Spoto 
2006).
This study will utilize ego-centered networks and the nominalist strategy to observe 
the selected social actors’ networks and demonstrate how they tugged their state-crime 
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‘webs of significance’ (Venkatesh 2013) to achieve their self-interest; thus, steering the 
development of Las Vegas and Macao to what we know of it today. The study will rely on 
primary and secondary sources of data to identify alters with ties to the focal actors, and 
use the collected data to inform the research of the overall social embeddedness of the 
focal actors’ networks during their respective selected time frames. This is an acceptable 
data collection strategy in SNA for acquiring recorded data on social relations (Scott 
2013, p. 41).
Results and discussions
State‑crime elites and their empires
In understanding the ways of these powerful state-crime elites, it becomes appar-
ent that the glorious transformation of the casino-cities was no accident; rather, it was 
engineered. As mentioned previously, before 1940s for Las Vegas and 1960s for Macao 
respectively, economic growth was not consistent and social stability was threatened. 
Moreover, both governments had no clear vision for socio-economic development 
and thus relied on interventions from the federal government or higher authorities 
and elites. In such cases of uncertainty and turmoil, Mills (1956, p. 27) argues that the 
“shifts in the structure of society open opportunities to various elites”. Two groups of 
elites took the gambling concession before Dr. Ho, the Hou Heng Company in 1930 and 
the Tai Heng Company in 1937 (Pessanha 2012, p. 51), and various elites attempted to 
revive Las Vegas economy before Mr. Dalitz came into the picture. Yet, amidst their best 
efforts, they could not reinvent the society. It took economic elites with ties to criminals 
and statesmen to resuscitate the economy and transform the society.
Morris ‘Barney’ Dalitz on Las Vegas (1940s–1980s)
In building his empire in Las Vegas, Moe Dalitz used his ties to statesmen, public offi-
cials, business elites, and organized crime figures he had befriended throughout his life. 
During the 40 year period, Moe Dalitz strategically ‘tugged’ his ties to statesmen, such as 
Patrick McCarran (U.S. Senator from 1933–1954), Paul Laxalt (serving Las Vegas in gov-
ernment positions since the 1960s and U.S. Senator from 1974–1986), and the Reagan 
administration (1981–1989), and public officials, such as J. Edgar Hoover (1924–1972), 
largely taking advantage of Nevada’s democratic electoral system for political king-mak-
ing and the national law enforcement agencies for covering his tracks, and protecting 
his friends, to do his bidding in creating favorable political and economic conditions for 
the developing Las Vegas and evading the law. For example, with regards to protecting 
Moe Datliz and his organized crime affiliates in Las Vegas, J. Edgar Hoover helped steer 
FBI investigations clear from Moe Dalitz and his associates throughout his term as head 
of the FBI (Newton 2009), Pat McCarran helped during the 1950s Kefauver hearings, 
and Paul Laxalt helped in the 1970s–1980s with other federal investigations and silenc-
ing the media; with regards to earning more money by making void or reducing tax 
bills, Pat McCarran fought and negotiated the reduction of tax rate of federal tax bills 
from 10 to 0.25 % (Las Vegas Review-Journal 1999a), and Paul Laxalt and the Reagan 
administration ensured that two federal tax bills were not passed (Newton 2009); with 
regards to protecting the ‘shady’ operations of his hotel-casinos, Grant Sawyer steered 
clear investigations into Desert-Inn in the 1960s (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
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2001, p. 2586); and, with regards to gaining a stronger foothold in the government and 
appearing ‘legitimate’, Paul Laxalt and the Reagan administration appointed associates of 
Moe Dalitz in advisory positions for the Reagan administration (Newton 2009) and Moe 
Dalitz himself as a special assistant to Paul Laxalt after being elected to office (Orlando 
Sentinel 1987). The amounts that went into the pockets of the government and pub-
lic officials were in the hundreds of thousands of dollars and it is not known just how 
many officials received payments, except that Moe had extensive ties which could help 
him ‘cover’ up anything and there were not many state or local politicians who were not 
financed by Moe Daltiz and his associates (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2001, pp. 184, 
204). This ‘strategic tugging’ of social networks was possible because of the instrumental 
use of his hotel-casinos, largely Desert-Inn, which opened in the 1950s, and Stardust, 
which opened in the 1970s, and the Teamsters Union Pension Fund for political-king 
making, ‘buying off’ people, and an overall expansion of his legitimate portfolio of hotel-
casinos in Las Vegas; which attracted more statesmen, economic elites, and public offi-
cials who would frequently patronize his establishments. Noting funds that flowed from 
Mr. Dalitz’ establishments and related-operations—involving an legitimate economic 
elite ‘front-man’ for the hotel-casinos, e.g., Wilbur Clark (U.S. Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation 2001, p. 219), illusory board of directors and stakeholders (U.S. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation 2001, p. 183), which concealed the identity Mr. Dalitz’s mob associates, 
such as Morris Kleinman and Samuel Tucker (Gottdiener et  al. 1999), and umbrella 
corporations, such as the Nevada Hotel Association, to get licenses from the Nevada 
Gaming Control Board—, to the pockets of public officials and statesmen, although all 
merely speculation, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation recognized a ‘reinforcing 
smokescreen’ that Mr. Dalitz created. This ‘smokescreen’ concealed frequent, large-scale 
‘skimming’ operations, mostly from Desert-Inn and Stardust, which helped finance sub-
servient statesmen to office, ‘buy’ amicable law enforcement officials, ‘hire’ ignorant eco-
nomic elites, and, taken together, ‘secure’ a development system that was impenetrable 
by internal and external interveners.
Behind the numerous ‘fronts’ Moe set up, Moe and his mobsters were involved in 
money laundering, political-king making, and decision-making for future investments 
and current affairs in Las Vegas. None of the ‘front’ men had any power, including the 
‘presidents’ like Wilbur Clark (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 2001, p. 149), and 
the statesmen, such as Pat McCarran, Paul Laxalt, and Grant Sawyer, all abided to Moe 
Dalitz’s will. Since the 1960s, Moe and his associates would actively contribute to politi-
cal campaigns and support political offices through the Nevada Hotel Association, spe-
cifically the Desert-Inn group and later Stardust group, by the aforementioned casino 
skimming operations (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 2001, pp. 184, 112, 89). This 
lasted well onto the 1980s. Moreover, Moe and his associates were in frequent contact 
with financed statesmen and, no matter democrat or republican, Moe directed his asso-
ciates to support any candidate who shared their vision and readily accepted advice 
on how to run the campaign to win (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 2001, p. 89). 
But just how did they finance so many politicians and government officials? While the 
FBI acknowledged that most of the local politicians were supported by the Desert-Inn 
hotel group and other hotel-casino groups (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 2001, 
p. 181), other politicians or related authority figures on a much higher ‘playing field’ 
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often received their financial backings from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
(IBT), also called Teamsters Union. The IBT, a labor union group, was instrumental in 
Moe’s building of the Las Vegas Empire. The Teamsters Pension Fund was often used 
as a back-up financial source for covering costs to expand when the earnings from the 
hotel-casinos could not cover it (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 2001, p. 198). Sim-
ilar to the umbrella corporations, IBT was under the strong influence of Moe Dalitz. 
Although Moe was not part of IBT, he was the most influential loaner for the Teamsters 
Pension Fund (Newton 2009). Teamster Union officials, such as 1957 Union President 
Jimmy ‘Riddle’ Hoffa and 1983 Union President Jackie Presser, were intricately linked 
with Moe’s previous syndicate, i.e., the Cleveland Syndicate, and the organized crime 
group in Las Vegas, and they let Moe Dalitz and his associates use the Pension Fund as 
their private bank (Newton 2009).
In building his empire by wielding his legitimate and illegitimate instruments of power, 
Moe created a ‘pro-gambling’ atmosphere that not only influenced the political realm, 
but also the economic realm since the 1960s as Las Vegas officially recognized gam-
ing as a legitimate business and had a clear direction of development—to be a casino-
driven capitalist society (City of Las Vegas, n.d. 2015). In the 40  year time span Moe 
spent in Las Vegas, Moe also engaged in charitable works, e.g., funding the construction 
of a local hospital, and engaged in philanthropy, donating $1.3 million dollars to various 
NGOs upon his death through a charitable trust (Las Vegas Review-Journal 1999a). He 
was awarded Humanitarian of the Year in 1976 and the Torch of Liberty Award in 1982 
for his philanthropy and contribution to the society, particularly the gaming, recreation, 
and tourism sectors (Las Vegas Review-Journal 1999a). Even after his death in 1989, the 
pro-gambling atmosphere and image of world-class recreation he helped create encour-
aged secondary economic drivers to develop air transport infrastructure, conventions, 
and gaming-related services (Lang and Nicholas 2011).
Dr. Stanley Ho Hung‑Sun on Macao (1960s–2000s)
In the 40 years spent to create his empire in Macao, Dr. Stanley Ho did not manipulate 
statesmen and public officials as much as Moe Dalitz, as the officials themselves wanted 
a “cozy relationship with the casino capitalist” (Lo 2007) and power to govern is often 
bestowed on economic elites by the colonial state (Risse 2013), e.g., through monopoly 
licenses. This is not to say however that Dr. Ho took a passive role during the decades he 
spent shaping Macao as a casino-city. Rather, during the 40 year period, Dr. Ho actively 
worked to cultivate and extend his social networks with political authorities and elites. 
For example, the gambling concession Dr. Ho won in 1961 and the extension of the con-
cession in 1986 was helped by actively cultivating exchange relationships, ranging from 
providing advice on how to handle the Cultural Revolution to providing donations for 
development projects in Lisbon, with the Portuguese administration (McGivering 1999; 
Pina-Cabral 2002). Shifting political stances from anti-Japanese to pro-Japanese, Stanley 
Ho made his entrance into Macao in his early adulthood after halting his support for the 
resistance in Hong Kong and moving to work in the Macao Cooperative Company Lim-
ited (McGivering 1999). Securing a position in the company, and being a grand-niece 
of Sir Robert Hotung, opened a lot of doors for Ho to develop relations with the Portu-
guese government in Macao, the Japanese army, the wealthy Macanese, and later on the 
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Chinese. It is during this war period that Ho, still in his early 20s, would accumulate his 
millions and accumulate social capital and extensive connections with resourceful busi-
nessmen and political authorities.
In 1961, realizing that the government-granted gaming concession in Macao was 
open, he joined with friends, Henry Fok, Teddy Yip, and Yip Hon, to form Sociedade de 
Turismo e Diversoes de Macao (Macao Tourism and Amusement Company) (STDM) 
to make the bid (McGivering 1999). STDM, with Dr. Ho holding the franchise name, 
won the bid in January 1st, 1962 and the building of Stanley Ho’s Macao empire began 
(Welker 2005; Milgram and Lichtblau 2009). Having observed the dynamics and orienta-
tions between economic elites and statesmen in the colony since he first came to Macao, 
he capitalized on the opportunity to expand his influence and control beyond the gam-
ing concession he was allotted. In the 1960s, upon receiving the monopoly, he started 
financing educational and religious institutions in Macao, introduced the first ferry 
(Hydrofoil) to the Hong Kong-Macao sea route, and became active in community works 
(Welker 2005). In the 1970s, the long awaited casino, the Hotel Lisboa opened, Shun Tak 
Enterprises was established, the Jetfoil (upgrade of Hyrdofoil) was introduced to shorten 
travel time between Hong Kong and Macao, and millions were being used to finance 
development projects (Welker 2005, p. 59). Hotel Lisboa, Dr. Ho’s flagship hotel-casino, 
helped STDM make a net profit of over US $20 million annually, with just under US $5 
million being allocated annually to community-development projects (Welker 2005, p. 
50–51).
This revenue, for the state and Dr. Ho, skyrocketed in the 1980s when, in 1986, Dr. 
Ho’s Grand Lisboa introduced VIP rooms, an exclusive gambling space catered for ‘high-
rollers’ (Wang and Eadington 2008). VIP rooms became core earners in casinos as a 
single VIP room of the Lisboa Casino could gross over half of the total revenue from 
Baccarat; Baccarat accounts for 65 % of the total earnings in casino (Pinho 1987). This 
market brought in the majority of all gaming revenue in Macao (Pessanha 2012, p. 112). 
Of course, this also meant a lot more profit for STDM and Dr. Ho in particular, since he 
gained total control of STDM in the mid-1980s (Milgram and Lichtblau 2009).
But how was this ‘VIP’ system so successful? Later discovered, the VIP room attrac-
tion in the Grand Lisboa involved ‘shady characters’ and housed ‘shady businesses’, all 
of which Dr. Ho supposedly sanctioned because the VIP-room contractual system was 
not codified in law and thus STDM, with Dr. Ho as its leader, played the dominant role 
in establishing rules and managing the system (Wang and Eadington 2008). It was soon 
discovered that triad societies had been running the VIP rooms and junkets (Canadian 
Intelligence Resource Centre 2004). According to a special report by the State of New 
Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety (Milgram and Lichtblau 2009, p. 8–9), “The 
VIP room structure, introduced in 1986, facilitated the involvement of Asian Organ-
ized Crime in STDM casinos… The VIP rooms in the STDM casinos provided organ-
ized crime entry into the gaming market that it had previously lacked… STDM created 
a “lawless space” that allowed organized crime to gain a foothold in the Macao gaming 
industry.” Having triad societies, such as 14 K or Wo On Lok, operate in one’s establish-
ments was a violation of Art 288 of the Penal code of the Macao gaming law, which pro-
vides for the offence of criminal association (Chan 2012, p. 127). While triad societies 
have always been notorious for their illegal gambling activities in Macao (Coates 1978), 
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reports showed that Dr. Ho was and still is letting the organized criminal gangs “oper-
ate and thrive” within the premises of his casino establishments (Asia Pacific Post 2010; 
Milgram and Lichtblau 2009); engaging in loan sharking, prostitution, selling drugs, and 
money laundering operations as conduits within the casino premises (Canadian Intel-
ligence Resource Centre 2004). However, despite sanctioning their operation, Dr. Ho 
denied any ‘foul play’ and simply stated in response to allegations: “to be associated with 
or to know someone is completely different (from being one)” (Pablo and AFP 2000, p. 
2). Dr. Ho was not dismissing allegations he was affiliated with them, rather he dismissed 
allegations that he held triad membership. So, not being a triad member, how did Dr. 
Ho come to be acquainted with the triads? Dr. Ho had several ties to organized crime-
affiliates; that is, individuals with notable ties to members of organized crime groups, 
such as Mr. Yip Hon. In bidding for the concession, Dr. Ho chose Yip Hon as a partner 
specifically because “I needed someone who knew the inside of the business…who was a 
professional gambler” (McGivering 1999, p. 111). Yip Hon, as reports show, was not only 
a professional gambler who knew the insides of the casino business, but he also had a 
triad background (Asia Pacific Media Services Limited n.d. 2015).
While Dr. Ho was ‘passing through the law’ with questionable working arrangements 
of the VIP rooms, the state officials and public officials simply turned a blind eye. Macao 
was profiting from the VIP room high-rollers as it fueled the development of Macao’s 
infrastructure and community. Thus, why would they stop Dr. Ho from doing something 
that benefits Macao, although it violates the law? In the late 1980s, due to the significant 
rise in revenues from the VIP rooms, Dr. Ho invested in TDM (Teledifusão de Macau), 
Macao’s most popular television network, and the development of the Macau Interna-
tional Airport, which would open in 1995. Nearing the end of the century, the span of 
investments STDM had nearly covered the whole of Macao’s economy (Pessanha 2012, 
p. 52). Dr. Ho’s instrumental use of legitimate and illegitimate powers not only helped 
him engineer a casino-driven capitalist society, but also achieve prominence and rec-
ognition worldwide. All his work to improve the financial outlook and social stability of 
Macao got Ho, in the 1980s, to be elected to high positions in various associations, for 
example vice president of the Macau SAR Basic Law drafting committee and Standing 
Committee member of the National Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consulta-
tive Conference, and earned him numerous accolades, including honorary doctorates 
and insignias (Welker 2005:59). Dr. Ho’s personal net worth was estimated at US $1 bil-
lion (Milgram and Lichtblau 2009).
Similar and divergent strategies
In building their empires, Mr. Dalitz and Dr. Ho shared similar ‘game plans’; accumulate 
vast amounts of money and power, evade allegations of wrong-doings, and acquire the 
‘good guy’ image. However, the strategies they employed to do each of those activities 
had more variation.
In regards to the similarities in their strategies, both state-crime elites used bridging 
social capital and linking social capital to accumulate money and power and to evade 
allegations. Moe Dalitz used bridging social capital to stay in touch with his out-of-state 
organized crime associates and business-affiliates out-of-the country. Mr. Dalitz, moreo-
ver, used linking social capital to be affiliated with higher political authorities, such as 
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President Reagan, enabling access to greater power and resources. Likewise, Dr. Ho 
used bridging social capital to maintain relations with organized-crime affiliates, e.g., 
Yip Hon, and businessmen, e.g., Henry Fok, in Macao and overseas. Dr. Ho also used 
linking social capital to climb up the ladder, especially during the 1930s–1940s, when 
he socialized with various higher political authorities in the Portuguese and Japanese 
administration.
Another shared similarity is the decision to remain apolitical, which reflects their ‘neu-
trality’ and ‘anything goes’ attitude. Although both of them did hold positions in political 
and legal institutions, e.g., advisory positions, neither Mr. Dalitz nor Dr. Ho chose to 
run the race for political office because they already had access to state power, i.e., deriv-
ing power from the positions they held in political institutions and power bestowed by 
the state through relations with complacent statesmen or other equally high-positioned 
authorities. Especially for the case of Mr. Dalitz, this is unlike the results from Chin 
(2003) who found that organized crime figures turned legitimate businessmen would 
often run for office. A probable reason for the contrast may be due to the conditions 
in which the actors were in and their self-interests. In the case of Mr. Dalitz, there was 
no purpose for him to pursue political office because he was already involved in politi-
cal king-making. Strategically, he would be able to achieve more as an economic elite, 
unbounded by institutional obligations of the office that would otherwise hamper his 
efforts.
Mr. Dalitz and Dr. Ho differed on three strategies used to build their empires. The first 
difference relates to their social network and their interaction with the key players in that 
network. The ego-centered networks of Mr. Dalitz (Fig. 1) and Dr. Ho (Fig. 2) was cre-
ated using the primary and secondary data collected and analyzed in this study; perusing 
the relational dimensions and historical significance from the texts of alters to the focal 
actor to create the social categories of the ego-centered network. Alters were grouped 
into categories based on similar attributes, relational properties to the focal actor, and 
shared activities noted in the texts (Martino and Spoto 2006). The following categories 
were yielded for both actors: ‘statesmen’, ‘members of organized crime’, ‘public officials’, 
and ‘businessmen’. However, unique to Dr. Ho, an ‘organized-crime affiliates’ category 
was created. This joint category included alters such as Ip Hon, who served as both a 
connection to businessmen and a connection to the ‘underworld’. While the texts elu-
cidated direct relationships between the focal actors and the key players in each social 
category, the ‘members of organized crime’ category for Dr. Ho was indirect, running 
through the ‘organized-crime affiliates’ category. This sheds light to how Dr. Ho behaved 
socially when it came to the triad societies. Dr. Ho did not keep them close, socially and 
in business; rather, he used intermediaries to preserve his ‘clean image’, while also capi-
talizing on the capabilities of the triads in his businesses.
The second difference involved the need to shift identities, e.g., to cope with a change in 
political climate or evade the law. Mr. Dalitz, like his parents, frequently adopted pseudo-
nyms, changed birth dates, residences, and occupations in official documents (U.S. Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation 2001, p. 296). Moreover, Mr. Dalitz established a number of 
‘fronts’ to protect himself, his income channel, and his investments. Mr. Dalitz almost 
always used ‘front’ men to hold positions of ‘authority’ in his many enterprises, always 
had income channels coming from legitimate enterprises to ‘cover’ his more lucrative 
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income channels coming from illegitimate or quasi-legitimate enterprises, and often 
established umbrella corporations to increase the red-tape and smokescreen over his ille-
gitimate or quasi-legitimate enterprises. Dr. Ho, in contrast, used his ambiguous upbring-
ing and Janus-like characteristics to dabble between allegiances and affiliations so that his 
allegiance and affiliation falls in line with the dominant political atmosphere. As put by 
Pina-Cabral (2002, p. 95), “When he obtained his first gambling contract (in 1961) Stanley 
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Fig. 1 Mr. Morris Dalitz network. The ego-network of Moe Dalitz with respect to the key groups Mr. Dalitz 
used to shape Las Vegas










Fig. 2 Dr. Stanley Ho network. The ego-network of Dr. Stanley Ho with respect to the key groups Dr. Ho used 
to shape Macao
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Tung and married to the daughter of a locally important Eurasian family (the Leitão fam-
ily). Moreover, he was a figurehead for a syndicate in which he held only a minor share. 
Since then he has altered his importance within the syndicate as well as his favoured eth-
nic self-definition, insisting now on being considered Chinese”. This is what Wong (2009) 
refers to as being a ‘Chameleon’; the ability to “remain ‘in position’ during regime changes 
by changing their political appearance and affiliation flexibly” (Wong 2009, p. 61–62).
A third difference relates to how they handled allegations. Mr. Dalitz, with his vast 
influence over statesmen and public officials, was able to play down rumors and allega-
tions of ‘foul play’ to the point where he was never convicted in his life, despite being 
under the spotlight for more than half his lifetime. Transitioning to a respected business-
man in Las Vegas, illegalities had to be kept hidden, and Mr. Dalitz did just that by utiliz-
ing his ties to people of the ‘underworld’ and ‘upperworld’. Dr. Ho, in contrast, did not 
have to deal with those problems. Dr. Ho had enough influence and control over major 
institutions, such as the media (TDM), to do whatever he wanted. While he could not 
stop international papers from printing accusations about his ‘shady’ businesses and ties, 
local investigations into his unsavory ties and questionable business ethics were deficient 
and no one dared to cross him during his time in power. Moreover, in the case of violat-
ing laws, administrators and public officials looked the other way, so there was no need 
to avoid allegations except when projected from the international community. Suther-
land (1940, p. 8–9) puts it best, “Law is like a cobweb; it’s made for flies and the smaller 
kinds of insects, so to speak, but lets the big bumblebees go through.” In the cases of Mr. 
Dalitz and Dr. Ho, they had such a widespread influence and control over the develop-
ment of Las Vegas and Macao respectively that they could pass through the law easily; 
effectively, being ‘unchallenged’ architects of their gaming empires.
The nature of the state in a casino‑driven capitalist society
In investigating these two actors, it became apparent that the states in the respective ter-
ritories assumed subservient roles to the ruling elite. Dr. Ho’s unlawful practices in the 
casinos were not curtailed by orchestrated efforts of the authorities; rather, they turned 
a blind eye and watched state revenue from gaming increase. In the case of Mr. Dalitz, 
political corruption was rampant among statesmen as the mob financed anybody who 
had pro-gaming attitudes, not just McCarran, Sawyer, and Laxalt. In fact, most, if not 
all, state and national statesmen were directly or indirectly connected to the mob and 
Moe Dalitz, and were financed as they adhered to the interests of Moe Dalitz. As the 
state-crime elites assumed dominant positions in society, their influence, as seen from 
the results, was widespread and constructive.
This credits the instrumentalist Marxism tradition of the society-centric approach as 
the state was not autonomous and the statesmen were not independent of the schemes 
of the elites; rather they were ‘instrumentally’ used to adhere to the state-crime elite’s 
‘master plan’. However, the results also expand the instrumentalist tradition as it rejects 
the idea that state domination is an act exclusively for ‘upperworld’ non-state actors 
of the ruling class. Both investigated actors dabbled between the two worlds and took 
advantage of the ‘upperworld–underworld symbiose’ to dominate governance; in the 
words of Risse (2013, p. 11), it was a case of “governance with government via networks” 
using non-hierarchical steering methods. The ruling class of the ‘upperworld’ was used 
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by both actors, either as cover-men or for business expansionism, and the state was sub-
servient to both actors. Moreover, organized crime groups played an important role in 
the focal actors’ grand schemes and governance activities. In this sense, the state-crime 
elites created a secure environment that ‘contained’ their operations from any interven-
tions; they had established both legitimate defenders, i.e., state actors, and illegitimate 
defenders, i.e., organized crime, to secure their casino-driven capitalist system.
Challenges and opportunities for aspirers in the Global South
Reflecting on the aforementioned results and discussions, it becomes clear that replicat-
ing the Las Vegas and Macao model in the 21st Century would simply not be possible. 
The development model referred to here is one that capitalizes on ‘upperworld–under-
world’ relations. While indeed credit does go to Mr. Dalitz and Dr. Ho for recogniz-
ing the strength of the ‘upperworld–underworld symbiose’ and directing the symbiose 
towards fulfilling their ‘master plans’, the transformation of Las Vegas and Macao should 
be attributed to the development efforts of ‘upperworld’ state and non-state actors and 
‘underworld’ non-state actors, i.e., organized crime groups, acting in a complementary 
fashion. In both cases examined, they served to defend and ‘secure’ the growth machine, 
as well as to channel flow of capital and resources from the ‘upperworld’ and ‘under-
world’ towards development efforts. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, most, if not all, of the chal-
lenges faced in trying to replicate this 20th Century development model are related to 
the impact globalization has had on state and non-state actors, the global atmosphere, 
and the internal affairs of nation-states. It is not possible to replicate such a model 
because the very nature of the ‘underworld’ has changed, i.e., becoming less predictable 
with the rise of transnational organized crime and an enlarging ‘shadow economy’ [see 
Mandel (2010) for an in-depth discussion of how transnational organized crime, and the 
international political economy, has changed over time], the competition stiffened over 
gaming rights, and ideologues about casino-gaming in constant flux. This does not only 
make gaming development projects vulnerable, but the aforementioned challenges also 
have potential to misappropriate benefits accrued by a gaming-resort or casino-city (as 
an example, see the recent case of Canadian billionaire Michael DeGroote and organized 
crime involvement in his casino development venture).
Gaming resorts have proven themselves as economic drivers for socio-economic 
and community development, but key considerations must be in place to ensure its 
stability and protection. So, what are the elucidated opportunities evident from this 
study? In line with the framework used, we see the integral value of networking and 
instrumentally ‘tugging’ state-crime networks to fulfill goals and objectives otherwise 
not possible. It has potential to both make and break development. Thus, to protect 
gaming development projects, ensuring that the economic driver benefits the socio-
economic development of the community, we see the importance of establishing 
intelligence-gathering institutions and the importance of the executive handlings of 
a ‘determined and unmoving’ state over casino project developments and long-term 
maintenance. Before intelligence-related institutions can be established, it is impor-
tant to ensure that casino development is within the interest of the state. Enduring 
support from the state is key to protecting economic drivers. If indeed casino devel-
opment projects are in the interest of the state, and the state wants to accomplish the 
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organizational goals set out, then intelligence must be valued and acted upon (Wilen-
sky 1967).
While still a burgeoning practice and concept, since 1989, great hopes lies in it as the 
cold-war intelligence architecture begins to lose ground and the Global South starts 
to look to their own, rather than the US, for intelligence liaison and related-practices 
(Shiraz 2013). Casino developments, especially if in interest of the state, can provide an 
appropriate context for which to form an intelligence community that focuses more on 
‘internal’ and ‘domestic’ protection of assets rather than ‘confronting’ and ‘waging wars’ 
against an elusive enemy, which is characteristic of the Global North’s approach to using 
intelligence for supporting foreign policies (Shiraz 2013). Here, in the spirit of coopera-
tion, alliance, and friendship, South–South intelligence liaison holds promise for two 
reasons: (1) There is a dire need for intelligence liaison knowing that casinos are used 
as ‘points of transmission’ for terrorist financing, money laundering, and the like of ‘net-
worked’ activities that compromise the interests of the state; and (2) it would put South–
South cooperation on a new front that has not been embarked on before—intelligence 
cooperation for the purpose of protecting a niche economic driver, i.e., casino gaming 
resorts, by means of informing policy-making decisions and countering ‘comprising’ 
influences on casino-related projects.
Conclusions
In conclusion, this study has come to show that the emergence of Las Vegas and Macao 
was no ordinary development nor was it a crapshoot development; rather, it was the 
result of instrumentally concerted actions by economic elites with extensive and stra-
tegic ties to statesmen and organized crime groups. In the face of continuous failures by 
the state and economic elites to resuscitate the ‘boom-crisis’ economy of Las Vegas and 
Macao, it took non-state actors with intricate ‘webs of significance’ to state and criminal 
actors to govern the development of a society under limited statehood; transforming the 
lands into celebrated casino-cities.
Yet, in this realization, i.e., that the Las Vegas and Macao development models are 
not ideal in the 21st Century, a number of intriguing insights are also gained. Drawing 
from these two cases, opportunities for closer South–South cooperation and alliance-
building, especially on the fronts of intelligence-sharing and governance bodies, are elu-
cidated. The race for casino-cities in a highly connected world gives rising importance 
to the need for a secure environment that can preserve the interests of the state; be it 
core economic drivers, such as developing gaming-resorts, or other interests of the state. 
Adhering to the spirit of Asia–Africa cooperation, in the context of intelligence-sharing 
alliances and governance bodies for protecting the development of casino-resorts and 
casino-cities, trust and respect for one another is a necessity in this time of heightened 
global uncertainty and change. Only then, can the Global South truly rise together and 
live up to its principles.
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